The European Community by Messerlin, Patrick
14
The European Community
Patrick A. Messerlin
Liberalization of services in the European Community national product (GNP) of the EC-the equivalent of the
(EC) sends three clear messages to the current and future, GNPS of all the developing economies together. In the
multilateral negotiations on services. mid-1980s EC banking and insurance represented one-
1. As predicted by economic theory, unilateral liberal- third and one-fourth, respectively, of world business in
ization pays. Three or four EC states undertook unilateral those sectors. The EC fleet accounted for one-fourth of
liberalization of services during the 1970s and 1980s, world shipping capacity, EC transport for one-fourth of
more than ten years before the EC initiated its 1992 the air traffic of the countries of the Organisation for
program. Because these liberalizations were trade ori- Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and
ented (they opened national markets to foreign competi- EC investment in telecommunications equipment for
tion), they have yielded large gains to the consumers of more than 40 percent of OECD investment.
these "liberal" EC states.
2. Unilateral liberalizations are fragile. A host of do- Unilateral Liberalizations as a Driving Force
mestic and international factors have joined forces to
close markets that had been liberalized. Monopolies that Only the United Kingdom and, more marginally, the
provided many services before liberalization have re- Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, and the Nether-
tained considerable influence in the small national mar- lands have been able to undertake unilateral liberaliza-
kets. Nonliberal EC states have inhibited competition by tion in airlines, banking, securities, and telecom-
keeping their own markets closed. As a result it has munications.1 All of these moves share three features.
proved difficult to maintain a substantial level of compe- They have followed common time sequences, and the
tition in liberalized service markets in the long run. resulting convergences have considerably eased the
3. Reinforcing and expanding unilateral liberalizations 1992 program. They offer alternative solutions to the
inside the EC has required a multilateral liberalization- delicate balance between competition and privatization
the 1992 program, which was nurtured by the unilateral that may be of some interest for developing countries.
liberalizations and is consolidating them by diluting for- Last, and of the utmost importance, they all include a
mer dominant firms in larger markets. The program also crucial trade component that qualifies them as genuine
makes liberalization attractive to EC states unable to trade liberalizations.
undertake unilateral liberalizations in that it decreases
the political costs of implementing liberal policies. Common Liberalization Sequences
These three messages suggest that the Community's
experience can be a driving force in the Uruguay Round Financial services provide the most complete illustration
negotiations on services. The 1992 program, however, is of common time sequences in unilateral liberalizations.
merely domestic liberalization. It does not contain an During the 1970s and 1980s public policies and regula-
explicit foreign trade policy in services, and this missing tions have been a crucial engine of innovation in finan-
aspect has nurtured fears of a "Fortress Europe." If the cial services. In banking, macroeconomic policies have
1992 program is implemented behind high barriers, it been accompanied by an endless flow of new financial
will generate huge distortions that will be detrimental to products-Eurobonds, fixedrate Euronotes, floating rate
the welfare of the Community and the world. The huge notes, note issuance facilities (NIFs), revolving under-
2size of the EC service sectors has fueled these fears. wridng facilities (RUFs), and swaps of all kinds. In
Services account for roughly 60 percent of the gross insurance, innovations have been fueled by domestic
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policies, in health care, for example, and by intemational were well adapted to provide standardized services with
policies such as freer trade in goods, which gives rise to the use of traditional technology-transport of small
larger risks. These innovations have required easier ac- numbers of air travelers between a few important towns,
cess to increasingly large capital markets. In such an basic phone calls, and so on. But protected flag carriers
environment some financial operators-such as the "uni- and post and telecommunications operators (PTos) have
versal" banks or insurers that provide most of the finan- not been able to provide efficiently the "new" services
cial products-have exhibited comparative advantages. made possible by modem technology. Examples of such
All unilateral liberalizations in financial services have services are "charter" air transport of large crowds of
sought to favor the emergence of these new types of tourists to a host of exotic places and "electronic high-
operators and their access to large and flexible stock ways" that provide a wide range of services-from data
markets by following a three-step pattem: removal of transmissions to "chatlines" and telephone games-to
the barriers between the various parts of the banking individuals or firms who hook their computers to their
industry to facilitate the move toward universal banks; telephones (Feketekuty 1989). Monopolies could not
abolition of foreign exchange controls to provide the cope with such a rate of innovation. Market competition
large amounts of funds needed by financial operators; was necessary.
and the introduction of stiff competition in the stock The capacity of public firms to discriminate and cross-
market-the key market for an industry increasingly subsidize between the markets of traditional services
dominated by securitization. reinforced the complexity of the problems raised by
Germany has long had universal banks and no ex- diversity. The best illustration is provided by PTos. More
change controls. By contrast, British financial services profitable than flag carriers (their average net income
were heavily regulated at the end of the 1960s. Starting represented 10-20 percent of their revenue, as against
in 1971, however, the interest rate cartel operated by the 5-7 percent for flag carriers), PTOs were able to subsidize
principal British clearing banks was dismantled and the equipment manufacturers massively. For instance, direct
markets serviced by the banks and the building societies subsidies from French Telecoms to French equipment
(the main savings and mortgage institutions in Britain) producers have amounted to more than ECU 1 billion a
were integrated. In 1979 Britain abolished foreign ex- year since 1983, and roughly 65 percent of the costs of
change controls, finally catching up with Germany. In the videotext Minitel are subsidized by French Telecoms
the mid-1980s the balance between the two countries (OECD 1988, p. 30;LeMonde, June 30, 1989 andJuly 17,
changed. German financial services, although liberal- 1989). Despite this strong grip on their sector, PTOS have
ized, remained protected from foreign competition, been unable to forecast the demands with the highest
whereas Britain, starting in 1986, was the first to open growth (for instance, mobile phones in the French case)
the stock market to stiff foreign competition. The new and to raise the financial and human resources necessary
regulations aimedatcreating one market (by merging the to match competition-driven markets in providing the
Euromarket and the London StRck Exchange) and one "new" services.
type of operator (by merging brokers and jobbers into Privatization of public monopolies was seen as the
market makers); giving the Bank of England a decisive natural way to create the competitive markets required
role in the crucial market of gilts (British government by the "new" services. Unilateral liberalizations, how-
securities); and introducing a drastic trade component. ever, show that there can be a conflict between competi-
The admission of corponate members to the stock exchange tion and privatization, especially as the latter is rarely a
regardless of nadionality and with no preset limit on the constraint-free choice. The privatization of British
numberof seatsavailablehasbeenatthecoreof theincreasing Telecoms was an unexpected consequence of British
importance of the London Stock Market since then. rules on the public budget,3 and the German constitution
Financial services elsewhere in the EC have followed has prevented privatization of the Bundespost. Govern-
the same pattern of evolution. Most EC states have taken ments that are obliged to privatize may want to make the
the first step by now, and nearly half have reached the step more attractive by selling firms with a flow of future
second step (the exceptions are Greece, Ireland, Portugal, potential rents-that is, by selling monopolies. Private
and Spain). Only Britain has fully achieved the third step. buyers of such public monopolies are likely to oppose
any future move toward competition that might erode the
Competition and Privatization rents expected or paid.
A sound liberalization sequence can overcome the po-
A powerful force behind liberalization in services was tential conflicts between competition and privatization.
the brake on the potential growth of many service sectors If new services-those that public monopolies are un-
exerted by the existing public monopolies. Public firms able to provide-are opened up long enough before
133
Patrick A. Messerlin
traditional ones, competitive markets can evolve that are to make liberalization credible.6 In a single year (1989),
large enough to reduce the potential anticompetitive several drastic measures were taken: the Bundespost
impact of privatization. This is be illustrated by three was split into three corporations (post, bank, and tele-
examples. communications); its monopoly in customer equipment
In Britain, the liberalization of charter air transport (a was ended; competition from private firns in data and
new" service) in the 1960s and 1970s gave birth to mobile telecommunications was introduced; the
markets that by 1984 represented one-third of all British Bundespost's ability to cross-subsidize was reduced by
air transporL In that year Britain began to liberalize the requiring that German Telecoms use flat-rate charges
traditional scheduled services by privatizing the flag (easier than the former usage-sensitive tariff for compet-
carrier, British Airways, and by tacitly setting up a du- itors to match) in some data services; and the first net-
opoly with a private carrier, British Caledonian (Vickers work of mobile phones was licensed to a private group
and Yarrow 1988).4 In 1988 the duopoly collapsed with led by Mannesmann.7 Large competitors have been
the takeover of British Caledonian by British Airways, convinced and have begun large-scale operations.
but the negative effects of the collapse on competition Meganet (a subsidiary of German insurance firms) has
were limited because the large charter carriers were started leasing lines in bulk from German Telecoms and
powerful enough to buy half of the route licenses and of selling capacity on them for data traffic. Volkswagen,
the 5,000 airport slots owned by British Caledonian and IBM, and EDS (General Motors), among others, have
submitted to bids by the Civil Aviation Authority. begun to provide a wide spectrum of value added ser-
British telecommunications offers a different story. vices. But in the absence ofprivatization, the competitive
Britain began to liberalize traditional and new services fringeofsmalleroperatorsthatmaybecrucialforreaping
almost simultaneously, in 1982, when Mercury was li- all the potential gains from liberalization remains cau-
censed to offer the traditional voice services and to tious.
operate a network of the new value added services. At
that time value added services represented only 1 percent Domestic Liberalizations as Trade Liberalizations
of telecommunications revenues in Britain. As a result,
the prospects for competition did not look very encour- All the unilateral lieralizations undertaken by the EC states,
aging, especially since the government explicitly estab- although domestic in nature, rapidly incorporated a trade
lished a duopoly consisting of British Telecom and component and became authentic trade liberalizations.
Mercury (both privatized firms) for the first phase of First, liberal EC states felt it necessary to set up bilateral
liberalization, 198489. It was feared that the two finns agreements among themselves and with the United
would share a reason to oppose further liberalization- States to strengthen their liberalizations. Air transport
the need to undertake huge investments to modemize an provides an illustration: multiple designation (licensing
old network, in the case of British Telecom, or to create more than one domestic carrier for a given route), re-
a new one, in Mercury's case (Vickers and Yarrow, moval of restrictions on capacity and frequency, and the
1988; Beesley and Laidlaw 1989).5 The new regulatory automatic approval of airline fares (except in case of
environment, however, was liberal enough to allow Brit- disapproval by both countries) were introduced in bilat-
ish consumers to take full advantage of a wave of tech- eral air agreements between liberal EC states (Britain-
nological progress and to generate an explosive growth Netherlands, Britain-Ireland, and so on) after 1984.
of demand for private telecommunications networks, Second, unilateral liberalizations offered consumers
basic services (mobile phones), and value added ser- new opportunities for substituting services produced in
vices. In less than five years the size of the markets under different EC states, including nonliberal states. Because
competition has become so large that the British govern- of this larger set of potential "arbitrages," the prices
ment can contemplate a huge injection of new competi- charged in all EC states were driven by the prices emerg-
tion: at least one firm, British Railways, with its huge ing in the more competitive markets of the liberal states.
and modern telecommunications network, can compete Telecommunications is a good illustration of the power
on equal terms with British Telecoms and with Mercury; of arbitrage. In 1985-86 the tariff reductions that AT&T
three more licensees (in addition to the two initial ones) introduced on transatlantic calls made phone calls from
in mobile phones; and, possibly, authorization for firms France to the United States 30 percent more expensive
to resell part of their private telecommunications net- in relative terms and obliged French Telecoms to lower
works to third parties. its own tariff by 20 percent. Heavy additional pressure
The German experience in telecommunications sug- was imposed by the new tariffs of British Telecom,
gests that when privatization is ruled out, a quicker and which made calls to the United States from eight of the
more massive introduction of competition is necessary EC states 15 percent cheaper (on average) if they were
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routed through Britain. Modem technology increased the scheduled fares and were similar to those in the deregu-
role of arbitrage. Since British Telecoms and AT&T were lated U.S. markets (McGowan and Trengrove 1986, p.
able to offer large multinational clients a better service 78). In 1987 scheduled fares on European routes with a
and to persuade them to locate their telecommunications significant charter presence were estimated to be 40
hubs outside nonliberal countries, the PTOs concerned percent lower than fares on routes with little or no charter
have been forced to take a more liberal attitude with their competition (Financial Times, December 24, 1987). In
largest clients in order not to lose them. 1985 Mercury's phone tariffs were, on average, 15 per-
Arbitrage seems to have played a more important role cent lower than those of British Telecom; in 1989 they
than bilateralism. For example, in banking EC states were were 30 percent lower (Beesley and Laidlaw 1989, p.29).
concerned that their markets might lose business to more The impact on tariff structures has been even greater.
open financial markets in other EC members. Indeed, the Average price changes underestimate the impact from
failure of some EC states to liberalize their stock ex- competition because liberalizations tend to increase the
changes has benefited the stock markets of the most prices of costly services and to compensate by huge
liberal EC states. The London Stock Market reform trig- decreases in less costly services. For instance, commis-
gered a general movement away from the Continental sion rates on the London Stock Market increased by 5-25
stock exchanges, which obliged other EC states to begin percentfor transactions of less than 50,000, decreasedby
to liberalize their own regulations, and the liberalization 20-35 percent for bargains of 50,000-500,000 (the larg-
of some Continental stock exchanges in turn induced the est part of the market), and remained stable for larger
London markettorelax some of its stringentregulations. purchases (Price Waterhouse 1988, p. 133). Tariffs on
The opening of domestic markets to foreign producers the London-Amsterdam route increased by 5-15 percent
of services has been the most important feature of the for the most expensive seats, whereas inexpensive fares
unilateral liberalizations. Vested interests understood (late bookings in economy class) were offered at a 60
this point well and tried to stop arbitrage and bilateralism. percent discount.
In telecommunications the PTOS of the nonliberal Ec These new tariff structures reflect the reduction or
states (France and Germany) have refused to conclude elimination of the cross-subsidization policies of domes-
operating agreements with Mercury, which was obliged tic monopolies. Following liberalization in Britain, price
to enter into market-sharing agreements with British structures in telecommunications have diverged from
Telecom.8 In airlines the International Air Transport those in Continental Europe. In 1987 local calls were
Association (IATA) deliberately designed complex rules twice as expensive in Britain as in France or Germany,
for air fares to ensure that travelers from nonliberal EC whereas long-distance trunk calls were 50 to 70 percent
states could not take advantage of the proximity (by more expensive in France and Germany than in Britain.
road or rail) of European airports to one another to In the few niches that have seen stiffer competition, price
benefit from the few existing liberal policies (Kasper changes have been larger. In 1987 intemational leased
1988, p. 77). lines were 30 to 100 percent more expensive in France
and Germany than in Britain (Muller 1988, p. 139). The
The Gains from Unilateral Liberalizations most recent prices for private lines are considered
roughly in line with costs in Britain (although long-dis-
Britain's unilateral liberalizations of the early 1980s tance traffic is still subsidizing short-distance circuits)
were profitable enough to induce a few other Ec states whereas in Continental Europe they are, on average, four
(Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands) to undertake times costs (Financial Times, May 10, 1989).9
similar policies. Gains from liberalizations come from
three sources: lower prices for consumers, larger mar- LargerMarkets
kets, and new comparative advantages revealed by more
competitive firms. Lower prices brought about by domestic liberalization
are a sure way of increasing the size of domestic markets
Lower Prices and thus the probability that domestic exports will
become internationally competitive-a goal that in-
Liberalized airlines, banking, and telecommunications dustrial policies often fail to achieve at a reasonable
have all experienced price decreases. A few months after cost.
the introduction of the 1986 regulations, commission The number of stocks traded in the London Stock
rates on the London Stock Market had decreased by 20 Market grew by 20 percent in the first six months after
percent on average. In 1986 average British air charter the introduction of the new 1986 regulations. This
fares were lower by 10 to 30 percent than the comparable growth was mainly attributable to the competitive "beta-
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type" stock markets, defined as those with six or more charter company, Britannia, has been responsible for
market makers (or four quoting firm prices). roughly as many passenger-kilometers as Air France on
Air charter markets-now more or less liberalized in the intra-European routes, the second largest EC flag
most EC states-represented more than 60 percent of carrier after British Airways. In the second half of the
total European air markets in 1987. The British liberal- 1980s two charter airlines, Britannia and Dan-Air, ac-
ization was the first and has been the most far-reaching counted for more passenger-kilometers than Swissair. In
up to now, as can be seen in the fact that in 1987 British telecommunications the experience acquired in the lib-
charter services represented 60 percent of independent eralized cellular phone market in Britain has allowed
intra-European charter air traffic and more than twice the British Telecom to buy 20 percent of McCaw Cellular,
share of Germany (the second largest in the EC). one of the largest U.S. firms in this booming niche and
In telecommunications the ratio of calls as a share of the first truly national cellular network in the United
British gross domestic product (GDP) or to exports in- States.
creased in relation to the coiresponding ratios for Ger-
many and France by 15 percent and 25 percent, The Limits of Unilateral Liberalizations: Toward a
respectively, between 1980 and 1986. During the same Multilateral Effort
period calls from Britain to the United States as a share
of total calls between the two countries increased by 8 Despite these large gains, unilateral trade liberalizations
percent, reflecting decreased relative prices. Meanwhile, have proved fragile, and their political costs can be high.
the corresponding proportion decreased by 7 percent for Voters may find it easy to accept that cheaper air tickets
Germany and by 13 percent for France. In some niches for holidays improve their welfare, but-as users of
changes were more dramatic. The British market for subsidized short-distance phone calls-they are harder
value added network services is estimated to represent to convince that loss of these subsidies might be offset
80 percent of the total European value in the late 1980s. by the increased efficiency in the economy brought about
The British mobile phone market-operated by two by cheaper long-distance calls. Firms-the direct bene-
(soon, five) firms under competition-had five times ficiaries of telecommunications liberalizations-have
more subscribers than the German or French markets, little incentive to lobby for liberalization if they are able
which are run or dominated by PTos. to pass through their telephone bills to consumers, as
most European firms did during the 1970s and early
Revealing New Comparative Advantages 1980s, when telecommunications still accounted for less
than 10 percent of their costs. As a result, the late 1980s
New comparative advantages are revealed by firms saw some erosion of the unilateral liberalizations in two
working under the strict discipline of high competition ways.
and minimal rents. It is currently estimated that at least First, unilateral liberalizations have been under strong
one-fourth of the existing market makers in the London pressures in the liberal EC states. The competitive forces
Stock Market will leave in the near future. In the gilts introduced in domestic markets have been eroded by
market alone ten market makers of the initial twenty- former, but still powerful, monopolies. Flag carriers have
eight have retreated since 1986, and the current leading reacted to lower profits brought about by increased com-
four account for roughly 50 percent of the market. (Prior petition by buying substantial shares in the emerging
to liberalization, however, the two leaders in a field of competitors, as KLM did on the London-Amsterdam
only eight firms accounted for 75 percent of the market.) route. This vulnerability to old vested interests has also
Over the past ten years the number of tour operators been observed in the United States; in the early 1980s the
licensed in Britain increased from 473 to 703, and the U.S.governmentrenouncedamorecomprehensivecom-
profit margins of the top thirty slumped from 4 percent petition policy in air transport under the double pressure
in 1983 to roughly zero in 1987-88, leading to difficul- of foreign governments and of European and U.S. carri-
ties for the charter airlines (such as British Island Air- ers (Kasper 1988, p. 80). In telecommunications duopo-
ways) that depend on them. lies complain bitterly about being excluded from new
Benefits from such disciplines are most visible in the licenses-an example is British Telecom in mobile
sectors that have been liberalized for the longest time, phones-and lobby heavily for them.
such as charter air transport. Massive entry in air charter Second, gains from unilateral liberalizations have led
markets has selected the most successful tour operators the nonliberal EC states, initially hostile to liberalization,
to build large low-cost charter carriers able to compete to introduce quasi-liberalizations-"quasi" because the
with and become credible alternatives to foreign-flag sectors concerned are still sheltered from foreign com-
carriers. Since the mid-1980s the largest British (and EC) petition. Air transport offers good examples of quasi-lib-
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eralizations. Flag carriers have created their own charter The 1992 Program
carriers behind high barriers, as Lufthansa did with Con-
dorandAirFrance with AirCharter. "Flag charters" were This section reviews the part of the 1992 program de-
conceived by their owners largely as a deterrent to the voted to internal trade liberalization in services and the
entry of domestic independent air carriers, which as a corresponding economic gains that can be expected. It
result have had a difficult time growing. In 1987 the then examines the competition rules embodied in the
average size of the French and German independent Treaty of Rome, which have been the engine of the
carriers was 7 percent and 40 percent that of the British intra-Ec liberalization and have made the Court ofJustice
ones. The 35 percent stake that Air France was able to the cornerstone of that liberalization, and the elements of
buy in TAT (the fourth largest French air carrier) in 1989 an EC foreign trade policy on services that might emerge
led to increased dominance by the flag carrier. In such in the wake of the 1992 program.
closed markets, domestic competition is easily inhibited.
For instance, a recent attempt by Aero-Lloyd, the fourth The 1992 "Single Market" in Services
biggest German charter airline, to compete on domestic
scheduled routes with Lufthansa failed because a large The part of the 1992 program that deals with services
proportion of Lufthansa's passengers use internal flights consists of fifty-one directives to be drafted and adopted
only to connect with international flights and enjoy al- between 1986 and 1992.10 As of January 1990 more than
most free internal flights. Finally, quasi-liberalized mar- half have been adopted and the rest tabled. The program
kets remained under political control. In 1988 a proposal has adopted the broadest definition of services: it deals
to merge two small (by British standards) French and with trade in services related to factor movements-in-
Belgian charter carriers, Point Air and Trans European, cluding labor movement-and to cross-border move-
was blocked by the French govemment (this was in sharp ments of consumers as well as of services. Its sectoral
contrast with the govemment's blessing of the takeover scope is wide, covering previously untouched services
of UTA-the only large independent French carrier-by such as insurance, shipping, road transport, and profes-
Air France). Similar experiences can be observed in sional services. Finally, the 1992 program interprets
telecommunications and posts (express freight); most progressive liberalization essentially as meaning that the
European PTOs have created private subsidiaries-for less developed EC states will be granted longer time
instance, French Telecom created Chronopost (express periods for adopting common rules. Appendix 14-A
mail) and Transpac (data traffic). focuses on the most important directives in each service
Having kept foreign competition at bay can be a source sector.
of future difficulties, as French banking illustrates. In the
1980s the French govemment actively pursued a policy The Gains to Be Expected
of "universal" banks, and France has some of the largest
world conglomerates of banks-insurers-brokerage The 1992 program aims at dismantling intra-EC barriers.
houses. But because these giant "universal" banks were Despite previous unilateral liberalizations, these barriers
consolidated through state ownership and regulations in remain substantial, as indicated by the low ratio of intra-
noncompetitive markets, it is difficult for them to attain EC to extra-EC trade in services, which is 25 to 30 percent,
the Cooke Committee standard for capital adequacy (a or half of the corresponding ratio for goods. As a result,
minimum ratio of capital to assets of 8 percent), which price reductions and welfare gains can be expected to be
will become the standard in the post-1992 Community. large. Studies done under the auspices of the Commis-
To improve their competitive situation in post-1992 sion (the Cecchini report) estimate that price reductions
Europe, French banks might have to acquire foreign will be 21 percent (in Spain) to 4 percent (in the Nether-
firms. But that would require capital and would increase lands) in financial services, about 10 percent in air trans-
assets, causing further deterioration of the Cooke ratios. port, 5 percent in road transport, and 3 percent in
In air transport the increasing dominance of Air France professional services, for total estimated savings to con-
has inhibited a necessary decrease in wage costs; pilots' sumers of roughly 2 percent of the GDP of the EC (Emer-
wageshaveabsorbed70peicentofthedecreasein laborcosts son and others 1988).
allowedbythenew747 400aiicraftboughtbytheflag acrier These studies give to scale economies a large role that
(Le Monde, September 3, 1989). Under these circum- some have found excessive. In a substantial range of
stances, European liberalization is an attractive solu- services, such as retailbankingand insurance, economies
tion. of scale are likely to be small (Neven 1989), and the
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"single" European marketcould offer more opportunities if they abused a dominant position. Moreover, airlines
for differentiating products in diversified markets than carrying out a task of "general interest" (flag carriers)
for homogenizing them to make possible massive econ- were also subject to competition rules insofar as the
omies of scale (Centre for Business Strategy 1989). application of such rules did not obstruct the perfor-
Others, however, have argued that adding dynamic ef- mance of theseparticular tasks-areminder of the article
fects to the static effects measured by Emerson greatly 90 philosophy.
increase the gains to be expected (Baldwin 1989). De-
spite these controversies on the extent of the gains, there FINANCIAL SERVICES. Through a growing number of
is a consensus that the 1992 program will bring substan- cases looking at national banking associations and com-
tial benefits to the Community. mission rates in commodity markets, the Court is exert-
ing increasing pressures for a strict enforcement of
The Engine of the 1992 Program: Competition competition rules in banking (Commission of the Euro-
Rules pean Community, Reports on Competition Policy, vari-
ous years). The main contribution of the Court, however,
EC competition rules are embodied in three articles of has concerned the definition of the mutual recognition
the Treaty of Rome: article 85, on collusive practices; principle governing cross-border trade in insurance ac-
article 86, on abuses of dominant power; and article cording to which each EC state will recognize the licens-
90, which states that public firms are not exempt from ing rules of the others and will apply its own operating
competition rules embodied in articles 85 and 86 ex- rules on a nondiscriminatory basis to EC firm affiliates
cept as necessary for their "general interest" tasks. (see appendix 14-A, "Banking"). In four recent rulings
Until the mid-1980s these rules were barely used in the Court extended to this trade two basic concepts
services because existing service providers, benefiting elaborated for trade in goods in the Cassis de Dijon case:
from noncompetitive markets, had no motive for in- the obligation that EC states not erect trade barriers be-
voking them. Competition-oriented markets shaped by tween themselves and the relevance of the public interest
unilateral liberalizations since then have generated test as a restriction on freedom to provide services.
firms and people that are eager to see their rights to According to the Court, existing Community law does
competition enforced and to take cases to the Euro- not provide sufficient harmonization to justify a claim
pean Court of Justice. that the public interest is already protected by the home
state of the exporters of insurance services. Small poli-
AIR TRANSPORT. In a 1986 ruling on a case examining cyholders ("mass" risks, in Community jargon) could
Air France's allegations of price undercutting by the thus be confused about the real coverage offered by
French tour operator Nouvelles Frontieres, the Court insurance products imported from other EC states. In
stated that EC competition rules apply to scheduled air other words, "imperative reasons relating to the public
transport. That ruling has definitively brought the sec- interest" may justify restrictions on the freedom to pro-
tor-which since 1962 was exempted from the enforce- vide cross-border insurance services for small policy-
mentof articles 85 and 86-back undercompetition rules holders.
(van Bael and Bellis 1987). This ruling on insurance has been criticizedas a setback
In April 1989 a second ruling extended, de facto, the to intra-EC liberalization (Hindley 1988). If greater har-
scope of competition rules to routes between the EC and monization in "mass" risks is difficult to achieve in the
the rest of the world. The case concerned the Frankfurt- near future, the Court's ruling would de facto limit the
Tokyo route. Two German travel agents discovered that, 1992 program to large policyholders ("large risks")-the
because of the difference between the market exchange only ones supposed to be capable of mastering the prob-
rates and the exchange rates used by the IATA when lems arising from "imported" insurance contracts.
setting theglobal network ofEuropean fares, theLisbon- The "general interest" principle, however, is suffi-
Frankfurt-Tokyo fare was much less expensive than the ciently complex to have a positive impact on liberaliza-
simple Frankfurt-Tokyo fare. An association "for the tion. First, it has obliged the Commission to definitively
campaign against unfair competition," backed by flag abandon the harmonization route in insurance and to
airlines, lodged a complaint of unfair competition and adopt the much less heavily regulatory approach of mu-
price undercutting against the two travel agents. The tual recognition through branching. This is the meaning
Court stated that price-fixing agreements for flights be- of the proposal by the vice-president of the EC Commis-
tween EC and non-EC airports were under the scrutiny of sion, Leon Brittan, to allow insurers to sell the full range
article 86 if they induced competitors to charge exces- of their products on the basis of a single license (see
sively high or low prices fares on a single route-that is, appendix 14-A, "Insurance"). Second, the principle wilt
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be useful for solving the disputes likely to emerge when The 1992 program has indirectly led to the emergence
enforcement of mutual recognition requires a precise of the first elements of the EC foreign trade policy in
border between licensing and operating rules. Finally, services, as illustrated by the debate on reciprocity in
the principle can be apowerful argumentagainst monop- banling and the Commission's desire that it (instead of the
oly power. For instance, if the basic telecommunications EC states) negotiate bilateral air agreements after 1992.
network is of "general interest" and could, under the Rome The most elaborate elements concern the shipping sec-
Treaty, be entrusted by EC states to a single operator tor. Two directives of the four on shipping in the 1992
(Financial Times, June 29,1989), the result may be a program specify rules involving non-EC states. The first
stronger enforcement of article 90 than under the present directive deals with "noncommercial" advantages en-
circumstances. joyed by foreign fleets in markets in which EC fleets are
operating. The directive introduces regulations and pro-
TELECOMMUNICATIONS. In telecommunications the cedures that, except fora few points related to the respec-
Court launched the 1992 program by reaffirming that tive roles of the Council and the Commission in trade
article 90 of the Treaty of Rome subordinates public policy in services, are similar to those of the EC anti-
firms to competition. A first ruling (on telex forwarding, dumping law, which is an instrument with a well-estab-
in 1985) stated that government-sanctioned monopoly lished protectionist and anticompetitive impact. This
practices could conflict with article 86 of the treaty. In first directive has already been enforced, in 1988. A
1987 the Commission used the procedure for the first Korean shipping firm, Hyundai, was accused of noncom-
time under article 90 in the 1992 program as the legal mercial advantages by European liners operating in the
basis for the directive liberalizing telecommunications European-Australian Conference and was subjected to a
terminal equipment. Such a procedure (which can be "redressive" duty of approximately 25 percent. As a
applied only if public firms that enjoy exclusive rights result, Hyundai has stopped its operations on the route.
use them in a way that restrains competition) authorizes The seconddirectiveprovides forcoordinated Commu-
the Commission to act without a vote by the EC states. nity action with diplomatic initiatives or countermea-
Because of this procedure, the directive on terminals has sures in cases in which third countries restrict access of
been enforced and continues to be valid, although four EC shipping companies to ocean trade. The threat of
EC states (Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy) have Community action-which makes this directive similar
asked the Court to examine the legitimacy of the toaU.S. Section 301 case, but limited to shipping-cov-
Commission's use of article 90. Since then, the Commis- ers bulk and liner cargoes, tramp services, passenger
sion has used the article 90 procedure twice: as a basis transport, and movement of people or goods to or be-
for liberalizing the Community's ECU 65 billion market tween offshore installations. The first case under this
of value added services and to request regulatory changes directive, which concerned the routes between Europe
in the Dutch express mail regulations (Financial Times, and the United States, was lodged in 1987 and was
January 9, 1990). renewed in September 1989.
The concept of "fair" trade is not ignored in other
The Emerging EC Foreign Trade Policy in Services services, even if it has not been embodied in directives
so far. As shown below, it has surfaced in the banking
The 1992 program deals exclusively with intra-EC mat- dispute between the EC and United States. In air transport
ters. The number and force of the trade barriers to be the unfair advantages allegedly enjoyed by "low-wage"
dismantled if the EC opens its borders to foreign services air carriers have been cited. In telecommunications the
indicate how deeply entrenched is protection of some first liberalizations in services are not, at this stage,
sectors (table 14-1). Whatever the borderline between giving rise to actions such as those against Hyundai in
the Commission's and the EC states' powers in trade shipping, but they have triggered increased imports of
policy in services turns out to be, the EC states will retain telecommunications equipment, which have already
many ways of influencing trade in services in the near been under antidumping actions. In July 1987 and March
future. (For instance, airports and air control are still 1988 the ad hoc office of the EC Commission initiated an
under the jurisdiction of the EC states, and restrictive antidumping case against exports of mobile cellular
practices in this domain may create substantial barriers phones from Canada, Hong Kong, and Japan. This action
to freer air transport.) The figures confirm the leading was echoed in the warning by Oftel, the British watchdog
role of Britain and the foot-dragging of France, Italy, in telecommunications, against service providers that
Spain (and, at this time, Germany). It also suggests that the lure users with cheap, low-quality mobile phones but
smaller EC states may be more open than the larger ones. impose high call charges.
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Table 14-1. Main EC Barriers, as Reported by U.S. Firms, 1985
Service Belgium Denmark France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherland Portugal
Air transport 2 1 3 2 1 1 2 1
Banking
Construction 1
Insurance 1 1 1 4 2 2 3 1 1
Films and broadcasting 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Professional services 2 4 1 2 1
Telecommunications 2 2 2 5 2 2 2 2 2
Tourism 1 2 2 3 4
Total, excluding shipping 10 6 14 14 9 7 15 6 10
Percentage 8.3 5.0 11.6 11.6 7.4 5.8 12.4 5.0 8.3
Shipping 2 5 4 4 4 5 3 5 1
Total, including shipping 12 11 18 18 13 12 18 11 11
Percentage 73 6.7 10.9 10.9 7.9 7.3 10.9 6.7 6.7
Note: The U.S. Trade Representative study is based on reports by U.S. exporters ofservices about "selected problems" they encounter. As a result,
it tends to mirror the capacities of the United States to export-that is, it overestimates barriers in relatively open states or sectors and underestimates
the others. This is why another source has been considered for shipping (White 1988).
Sources: For all services except shipping; ussR (1985). For shipping; White (1988).
The EC 1992 Program and the Uruguay Round workers from developing countries; some will be re-
on Services cruited by Ec firms, as in the case of the flagging-out
shipping policies examined above. But it will undoubt-
What implications and lessons does a successful 1992 edly hamper many firms from developin~ countries in
program have for the Uruguay Round negotiations? The exploiting their comparative advantages.
implications concem the impact on the EC's negotiating
position of the crucial choice made by the 1992 pro- The Impact on the EC Negotiating Attitude
gram-to adopt the widest scope of trade in services.
Lessons follow from the fact that the 1992 program has That no service sector is a priori excluded from the
already begun to test many of the main concepts to be agreement has allowed the EC to balance as much as
embodied in the Uruguay Round, as best illustrated by possible the interests of its potential exporters and im-
the rules on market access and competition. porters in the Uruguay Round negotiations. To this ex-
tent, the 1992 program has decreased the likelihood of a
Scope "Fortress Europe"-a combination of intra-EC liberaliza-
tion with high extemal protection.
The 1992 program embraces the widest scope the Uru- Trade balances are an indicator of the likely reactions
guay Round agreement on services could consider: it of EC service industries to a world liberalization under
covers movement of consumers and of the factors of Uruguay Round auspices. Negative or deteriorating bal-
production required for producing and selling services as ances are likely to be used as an argument for protection;
well as cross-border trade in services, and it includes increasingly positive balances could support protrade
future as well as existing services. The scope of the arguments. Table 14-2 shows the trade balances between
program has influenced the Community's responseto the the EC and the rest of the world for fourteen service
invitation in the Montreal ministerial declaration to sub- sectors. There may be active lobbies for protection
mit an indicative list of service sectors of interest; the EC against the rest of the world in four industries: telecom-
was one of only three Contracting Parties to table such a munications, advertising, films and broadcasting, and
list, and its list covers all internationally tradable service sea freight. Three industries-banking, insurance, and
sectors. There is, however, a significant difference be- travel-might favor a freer EC trade policy. The attitude
tween the 1992 program and the EC approach in the of the other sectors is more difficult to predict, either
Uruguay Round: the EC opposes coverage by the Round because trade balances are positive but deteriorating or
agreement of trade in services that requires labor move- because no clear trend has emerged. Table 14-2 is con-
ment other than that of "skilled and key personnel and firmed by table 14-1, which also suggests that telecom-
for a limited duration." This limit will not harm all munications, films and broadcasting, shipping, and air
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liberalize within a multilateral framework. That raises a
question: will the 1992 program, which aims at creating
United EC a customs union in services (or, to use the current word-
Spain Kingdom Total (percentage) ing of the Uruguay Round, a regional integration ar-
2 3 18 10.9 rangement) increase trade distortions by facilitating
3 3 1.8 trade between the constituent territories and raising bar-
1 2 1.2 riers to the trade of other contracting parties with such
1 1 18 10.9 territories-as most of the custom unions in goods did?
2 2 22 13.3 Or might regional agreements in services differ from
3 2 15 9.1
2 2 25 15.2 custom unions in goods in that they generate more forces
4 2 18 10.9 able to inhibit trade distortions than do customs unions?
1 7 13 121 The second alternative seems the more plausible be-
14.0 10.7 1l0.0 cause prior to regional agreement services are regulated
by a host of international agreements that make it diffi-
8 3 44 26.7 cult to increase the barriers between the members of the
25 16 165 regional integration agreement and the rest of the world.
15.2 9.7 100.0 These agreements were necessary because service pro-
ducers put much more emphasis on establishment for
market access than did producers of goods. The follow-
ing list gives a flavor of this extensive pre- 1992 network
of agreements and their impact on the EC.
transport are good candidates for supporting protection- In banking the rules adopted under the aegis of the Bank
ist policies, whereas banking should be more supportive for International Settlements have been incorporated in
of freer trade because it is more open. the EC directives, and bilateral agreements on coopera-
The sectors in which protectionist pressures are likely tion between agencies in charge of monitoring securities
to be the highest (telecommunications and air and sea markets have been signed between non-EC and EC coun-
transport) are also likely to be the most difficult to tries. In insurance the directive on motor insurance must
Table 14-2. EC Trade Balances in Services, 1980-86
(billions of ECUS)
Service 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Banking 0.89 0.95 0.80 1.77 2.32 2.88 3.12
Insurance 0.31 1.26 1.05 1.22 1.08 2.65 4.08
Telecommunications -0.11 -0.31 -0.47 -0.58 -0.47 -0.36 -0.33
Air freight 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.53 0.69 0.92 1.08
Air passenger 2.14 2.12 2.38 2.82 3.33 3.20 1.60
Seafreight 1.15 0.15 0.07 -1.14 -2.08 -2.32 -1.61
Sea passenger 0.25 0.28 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.54 0.53
Other transport 0.04 -0.28 -0.72 -1.37 -0.73 0.46 -0.47
Advertising -0.36 -0.37 -0.57 -0.83 -0.87 -1.02 -1.16
Films and broadcasting -0.12 -0.21 -0.21 -0.24 -0.30 -0.28 -0.46
Trade 0.05 -0.39 -0.20 0.39 0.08 -1.27 0.19
Other business services 1.92 2.53 2.56 2.82 2.76 2.79 2.70
Construction 2.61 3.50 3.57 3.00 3.58 3.15 2.62
Travel -0.58 0.23 2.38 6.49 10.47 11.86 5.76
Property incomes -1.53 -1.56 -1.89 -1.81 -2.31 -2.42 -2.60
Other services 2.14 3.48 3.56 3.88 2.61 5.28 6.33
Unallocated 3.07 3.31 3.38 3.52 4.25 4.39 4.30
Total 12.35 15.18 16.61 20.87 24.82 30.46 25.67
Note: There are no doubt many problems with these data. The main one is that they capture cross-border t ade flows and not sales of services
related to foreign presence-a cacial point for such sectors as banking.
Source: Matlisse (1989).
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remain compatible with the green card system that covers of "effective market access," defined as the situation in
non-EC countries. A U.S. life insurer can do business in which service providers of the two countries enjoy "com-
Britain under the 1986 Financial Services Act if its home parable competitive opportunities" (to use the wording
state is considered a "designated territory" under the of the Second Banking Directive) in the two markets.
act-like, for example, Pennsylvania is. In airlines the This concept sheds some light on reciprocity and pro-
66 air agreements between EC states are intertwined with gressive liberalization.
the 218 agreements involving the 22 European members
of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC). That RECIPROCrrY. Reciprocity is the threshold of mutual
Norway and Sweden are part of the SAS airline network concessions that trade partners consider satisfactory
with Denmark has necessitated special adjustments to EC enough to sign a trade agreement. It is a concept used in
rules to grant the Community's passport to SAS. In tele- negotiations, not in economics. In cross-border services,
communications the technical rules adopted by the Inter- national treatment links reciprocity to host country rules,
national Telecommunication Union (lTU) are enforced as it does in trade in goods. That financial services
by the European PTOs. EC rules are compatible with exported by EC banks are subject to U.S. regulations in
regional agreements involving non-EC countries, such as the United States and the other way around seems to be
the future MDNS (Managed DataNetwork Services) elab- an acceptable bargain for the two partners and is gener-
orated by Europe's twenty-two PTOs. ally the equilibrium point of the negotiation. By contrast,
that suppliers of services are subject to host country rules
Market Access Rules does not lead to such an acceptable bargain: producers
in the most liberal country are seen as disadvantaged in
Market access clauses, which are harder to define in the comparison with producers in the less liberal country.
context of services than of goods, have already been Although there is no economic rationale for this propo-
tested in actual situations in the Ec. The 1992 program has sition consumers may prefer the more stringent rules.
had to find operational ways of using such concepts as The "comparable competitive opportunities" concept
national treatment,reciprocity,andprogressiveliberalization. makes assessing reciprocity more complex because it
compares host and home country rules. The rule of the
NATIONAL TREATMENT, AND MORE. The Montreal decla- most regulated home country could be chosen as the
ration defines national treatment by the "no less favor- internationally agreed standard for reciprocity. In this
able" provision. For cross-border services, the concept restrictive option U.S. banks would operate in the EC
of treatment "no less favorable" in respect of all regula- under U.S. rules-that is, they would not be able to
tions than that accorded domestic services in the same engage in securities activities in the EC or to enter simul-
market has a clear meaning, similar to the accepted one taneously into all the EC states. (Such an option is close
for trade in goods. But this definition is plagued by many to the 1988 position of former EC Commissioner de
problems when services are "traded" through the estab- Clercq.) Conversely, the rule of the most liberal home
lishmentofsuppliersin "importing" countries.Forinstance, country could be chosen as the international standard.
it may exclude situations in which the domestic provider in Then EC banks would operate in the United States under
the importing country is a monopoly, as in air transport or rules similar to those of the EC; that is, they would be able
telecommunications in many developing countries. to conduct securities business in the United States, to
This first source of problems is modest compared with branch freely, and to provide cross-border services
the second: what does the Montreal definition mean throughout the country (which U.S. banks are not al-
when one trade partner imposes stricter regulations on its lowed to do). This option is close to mutual recognition
domestic firms than another partner-a situation that is and to the principle adopteA in July 1989 by the BC and
likely to be very frequent, if not the rule? The EC faced Switzerland in an agreement on nonlife insurance that
this problem in the specific context of the banking sector opens EC markets to Swiss firms on condition that Switz-
in a (sometimes acrimonious) debate with the United erland adapt its insurance laws to those of the EC.
States and Japan.13 Similar cases are likely to emerge in In the mercantilist approach to trade negotiations, this
other service sectors if the 1992 program succeeds. For wide range of options leaves no equilibrium point that is
instance, in air transport the fifth freedom between two easily acceptable by both partners. As a result, the EC has
EC states will become close to a cabotage right after 1993. chosen to leave the task of finding such an equilibrium
Such situations have led the EC to expand the definition point to procedures (internal consultations and negotia-
of national treatment (the "no less favorable" clause) by tions with the trade partner) that are applied case by case.
a provision that takes into account the mode of delivery Such an approach seems to be plagued by an opportunis-
of services in foreign markets. The EC forged the concept tic attitude and could endanger the multilateral trading
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system, as illustrated by the acrimonious banking debate Competition Rules
between the EC, Japan, and the United States, which has
been summarized as follows: "Reciprocity is a missile Competition rules have been crucial to the Ec internal
aimed at Tokyo which will land in New York and ex- liberalization. Lessons to be drawn for the Uruguay
plode on Capitol Hill" (Financial Times October 28, Round can be grouped around the three types of compe-
1988). Although there may be some basis for this fear, tition rules: "antimerger" (antitrust) rules, rules against
two points are worth noting. the "abuse of a dominant position," and rules against
First, countries that take the mercantilist approach to "collusive practices."
multilateral negotiations tend "involuntarily" to favor There is one crucial motive-in addition to the usual
solutions that are the most economically sound for the one of promoting competition-for including competi-
trading partners. Country A tries to get country B's tion rules in the Uruguay Round: such rules are an
markets as open as possible-a policy beneficial to the extremely economical way of regulating an economy.
consumers of country B-and the other way around. There are three reasons for this. First, competition rules
Second, reciprocity is not only a conflict between trading do not require lengthy provisions: the Treaty of Rome
partners but it is also a conflict of interests within each devotes 3 articles (out of 246) and fewer than 60 lines to
domestic industry of the two trading partners. For in- these rules. Second, since they concern only real prob-
stance, the restrictive option described above would lems revealed by the functioning of the markets, they
favor U.S. banks that already have a subsidiary in one EC minimize the need for reregulation and thus the risk of
state (and are thus able to branch through the Community premature or excessive reregulation-a danger in multi-
and reap all the benefits from the 1992 program) over lateral negotiations, which are always quick to consider
U.S. banks that are not already established in the EC. By all possible problems. Third, they maximize the effi-
contrast, the large influx of foreign securities firms into ciency of the minimal set of reregulations really neces-
the EC brought about by the liberal option could be sary by offeringasure way of enforcing theseregulations
beneficial to Continental stock exchanges-in which if they are consistent with the interests of consumers.
there are a lot of niches to be exploited-in relation to
London. ANTLMERGER RULES. Antimerger rules are unlikely to be
part of the Uruguay Round agreement because in many
PROGRESSIVE LIBERALIZATION. The concept of progres- countries many services areprovided by public orprivate
sive liberalization is essential in the context of the par- monopolies or duopolies, as in telecommunications. The
ticipation of the developing countries in the Uruguay experience of the Community suggests, however, that
Round. The concept of "comparable competitive oppor- the absence of antimerger ules will not impede the world
tunities" can take progressive liberalization into account liberalization; such rules at the EC level have played no
in two ways. First, it suggests that developing countries role in the intra-EC liberalization, since they were
need to create competitive structures in their own ser- adopted only in December 1989.
vices sectors in order to open them. It thus recognizes More interestingly, the EC experience even suggests
that developing countries may face the heavy task of that mergers-apart from their economic pros and
building new, competition-oriented, domestic regula- cons-can be a positive force for adopting a trade liber-
tions-a point often emphasized by developing country alization program. Mergers offer to each member firm a
negotiators. Such a perspective is present in the 1992 share in the comparative advantages of the other suppli-
program: the Community's less developed countries ers and in other national markets that may have larger or
have often been granted a longer time period for opening more dynamic demands. National monopolies or domi-
their sectors so as not to put them at risk. nant firms can thus reduce the risks associated with trade
Second, industrial countries may agree to give firms liberalization through mergers, which become a crucial
from developing countries advantages greater than those instrument for dissolving the "national champions" in-
granted by these countries to firms from industrial coun- herited from the 1970s. For instance, the emerging Eu-
tries. They can do so by defining what they judge as ropean "megacarrier" consisting of British Airways,
"comparable" to the competitive opportunities they KLM, and Sabena offers an unique opportunity for im-
offer. Industrial countries may be eager to graduate their proving the efficiency of Sabena by linking it to two
reciprocity threshold to the level of development of their efficient and wealthy firms and for achieving a partial
trade partners, especially if they do not feel trapped by a privatization of Sabena at the same time. (British Air-
rigid rule of "special and differentiated" treatment. ways and KLM will each own 20 percent of the shares of
143
Patrick A. Messerlin
the new Sabena World Airlines.) Both effects can only services will be liberalized, but networks will not, lead-
make Belgium's air transport policy more liberal. ing to the risk that the network owners will abuse their
There are similar recent examples involving firms from dominant position if they provide services and compete
developing countries. For instance, Singapore Airlines with mere suppliers of services.
and Swissair have signed a cooperation agreement with Rules against abuses of a dominant position allow the
exchanges of equity. This agreement indirectly rein- solution to potential competition to be shifted from ex
forces the links between Singapore Airlines and Delta ante general regulations to ex post specific cases, as
Airlines (aU.S. company), and opens the way forsimilar shown by telecommunications value added services.
deals with SAS, Finnair, and a few other airlines. It Under the 1992 program PTos will keep their monopoly
generates a "global aviation system" that reduces the on networks but will make them accessible to competi-
risks of changes associated with world liberalization for tors in value added services. Preventing network-owner
each member firm and thus lessens the fears of the PTOs from abusing their privileged position to eliminate
govemments concemed. competitors has led to special rules of conduct (see
This role of mergers can also be observed in the equip- appendix 14-A, "Telecommunications"). In other words,
ment industries linked to service sectors. This is best liberalizing cross-border services-such as value added
illustrated by the telecommunications equipment pro- services-has led to thereregulation of the providers (the
ducers, which have constituted consortia for definite PTOs) of equipment (networks) and services (basic ser-
tasks.t4 For instance, the recent German bid for a mobile vices) that are not yet liberalized. Such a situation gen-
phone license was granted to a Mannesmann-led consor- erates complex questions. Should reregulation be applied
tium that included British, French, and U.S. firms. Four to the PTos alone, or should the regulatory activities
of the other offers also involved British firms, including cover newcomers as well? A satisfactory solution is
British Telecom itself. In the short run, such mergers, unlikely to reside in static and detailed regulations; it is
which are now frequent in telecommunications and con- more likely to emerge from the analysis of a concrete
struction, are a partial substitute for liberalization of the situation in which a given service provider perceives that
public procurement procedures. They lay the ground for it faces abuse of a dominant position, in the light of the
the still rare successes of individual firms (Ericsson in economically sound criterion of competition rules: the
the United States, AT&T in Italy, Sony in Britain, and interests of the consumers.
Fujitsu in Britain and Germany). In the long run, they Rules against abuses of a dominant position are neces-
ease the introduction of more competition-oriented rules sary for effective enforcement of codes of conduct and
in public tenders. similar regulations, as illustrated by the computerized
There is a point, however, at which the costs of such reservation systems. The two emerging EC megacarriers
mergers or consortia become higher than the gains. are organized around two CRss, with, so far, no future
Mergers may reach sizes that will hinder the emergence competitors in the EC, and with international connec-
and survival of otherwise efficient mavericks and will tions.15 As CRss are extremely expensive (both in phys-
thus make competitive markets impossible. In airlines, ical and human capital), they are operated by joint
for instance, the coalition between British Airways, KLM, ventures of airlines that have been exempted from com-
and Sabena and the one between Air France, Lufthansa, petition rules (another example of limited use of antimer-
and Iberia would in 1985 have represented 50 to 55 ger rules). The Commission is well aware of the risks of
percent of the air services operated by all the EC airlines. such an exemption, and the exemption has been subject
In sum, the absence of antimerger rules is an easily to conditions that ensure free access to the systems,
acceptable risk only if there are competition rulesagainst elimination of biases between air carriers, and more
abuse of a dominant position. flexibility for the contracts offered to travel agents. It has
also been complemented by the adoption of a mandatory
RULES AGAINST ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSMON. Dom- code of conduct insisting on nondiscriminatory and
inant positions are likely to be frequent in many service transparent use of the CRS. But the credibility of the
sectors because a successful Uruguay Round will merely exemption and of the code relies on the threat imposed
open the legal possibility for obtaining better access to by the existence of rules against abuses of a dominant
networks run by dominant firms (monopolies). These position and on the ability of firms to complain on a
networks include telephone lines run by PTos, computer- case-by-case basis.
ized reservation systems, or cRss-the electronic net- All these considerations are of special interest for the
works that allow travel agents to book flights and Uruguay Round. Many bN;ieve that "sectoral annota-
facilities-run by airlines; slots run by airport authori- tions"-that is, additional provisions interpreting and
ties; roads controlledby governments; and soon. In sum, clarifying frameworkprovisions for each individual sec-
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tor-will be necessary. That could represent a great based inside or outside the Ec states. The implied risk in
danger for the Round: interminable negotiations and terms of extraterritoriality may inhibit enforcement of
increasingly ambiguous, inconsistent or useless clauses, the code. The adoption of rules against collusive actions
offering a back door for protection. One can argue that in the Uruguay Round would offer a way of solving this
many "sectoral annotations" could be avoided by com- type of problem.
petition rules. Third, the Uruguay Round will adopt safeguards and
Two final remarks are necessary. First, competition is provisions that have a similar economic impact, such as
often stiffer than initially expected. In telecommunica- antidumping and antisubsidy regulations (Hoekman and
tions, private networks are only stating up. Public firms Leidy 1990). The GATT experience in such matters is
in similar services can generate competition pressures; crystal clear either provisions are designed with eco-
for example, SNCF, the French railways company, has nomically sound constraints (nondiscriminatory mea-
decided to create its own worldwide reservation system sure, compensation, and so on) and are rarely used, as
based on the technology of Sabre, the CRS developed by illustrated by the GATT article xIx, or they rely on am-
American Airlines (Le Monde, November 30, 1989). biguous concepts ("unfair" competition, domestic indus-
Second, a balance between the regulations to be applied try, and injury thatare rapidly captured by domestic firms
to dominant private or public firms should be main- looking for protection and are used as devices for enforc-
tained. These two types of firms have different ways of ing collusive practices with public sponsorship
abusing a dominant position, and the Uruguay Round (Messerlin 1990a). The concepts embodied in competi-
framework should take this difference into account, as tion rules against collusive practices offer a way of
the Treaty of Rome did by supplementing article 86 limiting this phenomenon of capture.
(focusing on private firms) with article 90 dealing with
public firms. A Brave New World: Competition in Regulations
RULES AGAINST COLLUSIVE PRACTICES. The EC experi- Services are regulation-intensive. As a result, compara-
ence shows that competition rules against collusive prac- tive advantages in services are determined by the ability
tices are a crucial ingredient in the initiation of of states to generate the best rules: states that open their
liberalization in services. Including such rules in the service sectors will compete in regulations. The more
Uruguay Round framework would be useful for three market access is granted, the stiffer is the competition.
main reasons. This is best illustrated by the mutual recognition princi-
First, Uruguay Round provisions are unlikely to lead to ple, which can mean better treatment of foreign firms
an immediate application of essential provisions to some than does national treatment. For example, if British
service sectors. For instance, the most favored nation licensing or operating rules are better designed than
clause is unlikely to be applied in air transport because French rules, French branches of the British banks will
this sector relies on a host of bilateral arrangements. As enjoy better treatment than French banks.
a result, it is likely that there will be a "freeze" in this Developing countries may be afraid to compete on
sector. The danger is that the freeze in liberalization of these terms because they may feel "disadvantaged" and
some sectors will continue forever and become a de facto "unprepared." But there are good reasons for them to
permanent exception, as in the case of textiles in goods. accept the challenge and to participate in the "uneasy"
Accepting a freeze is a risk that can be taken only if there free market revival (Henderson 1988).
are provisions that permit market forces to reveal a desire First, competition in regulations will induce developing
to move toward more competition. In the EC experience countries to elaborate their own regulations. Far from
the enforcement of rules against collusive practices has inhibiting their capacity to regulate-a fear often ex-
started the liberalizations in air transport and telecommu- pressed by developing countries-an economically
nications equipment, in particular. sound Uruguay Round will be a stimulus for them to
Second, many industrial and developing countries al- adopt better regulations. The EC experience in the past
ready have active competition rules. When applied to decade can be best described as a continuous effort to
service sectors, these national rules can easily lead to move from a set of inefficient regulations to a new set of
problems of extraterritoriality, which are political and rules that are more efficient because they support a
legal nightmares. In such circumstances, actions can take higher level of competition. There is no better illustration
decades or be abandoned, to the detriment of an econom- than the ongoing competition between the London and
ically sound procompetitive solution. For instance, the Continental stock exchanges. The 1987 crash revealed
EC code on cRss applies notjust to Amadeus and Galileo the weaknesses of some of the new regulations in the
but to aU CRSs operating in the Community, whether liberalized London International Stock Exchange, from
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too stringent rules on shareholders' preemption rights to Appendix 14-A. The 1992 Program, by Service
medieval methods of transfer. Continental stock ex- Sector
changes took these weaknesses as an opportunity to step
up the removal of old regulations and the introduction of BANKING. The main new directive, the Second Banking
new ones, and the past two years have seen a constant Directive, deals with the creation and implementation of
emulation among the regulatory bodies of the national a single EC banking license. After 1992 (and as in the
stock exchanges. past), bank subsidiaries, which are classified as factor-
Second, competition in regulations will be as dynamic related trade in services in the EC framework, will be
as in goods. Comparative advantages will shift, as they governed by the national treatment clause-that is, they
do in goods. By liberalizing long-regulated national mar- will be treated by the host EC state as domestic banks in
kets, the 1992 progran has imposed adjustment efforts terms of licensing and operating requirements. For in-
on the "free" markets that prospered during the nonlibe- stance, a French subsidiary of a British bank will be
ral period, such as the Eurobond market, the reinsurance treated as a French bank. The crucial innovation of the
market, and the insurance markets of the Isle of Man and directive concems the provision of cross-border banking
the Channel Islands. And the EC financial integration is services (for instance, money transfers) and bank
accelerating the pace of U.S. and Japanese reforms of branches, which are classified by the EC as cross-border
regulations that have imposed tight constraints on U.S. services. After 1992 these services will be ruled by the
and Japanese banks and insurance firms in their domestic principle of mutual recognition; each EC state will rec-
markets. Similarly, the expected liberalization in EC tele- ognize the licensing rules of the others and will apply its
communications has attracted the "Baby Bells"-the own operating rules on a nondiscriminatory basis to
regional U.S. phone monopolies bom of the breakup of branches of banks licensed in other EC states. For in-
the Bell System. The restrictions on their U.S. operations stance, a French branch of a British bank will be under
have induced them to invest in mobile phones, cable British, notFrench, licensing rules and will operate under
television, computer services, and fiber optic cables all French operating rules concerning monetary regulations,
over the EC: six "Baby Bells" (out of seven) have in- liquidity, and the like.
vested in such liberal EC states as Britain and Germany, In fact, banks operating throughout the Community
and, even more remarkably, three have invested in would be largely regulated by their home countries. The
France and two in Spain and Italy. exact coverage of mutual recognition is still uncertain
Finally, the gains to be expected by developing coun- because the borderline between licensing rules and oper-
tiries from liberalizing services are enormous. Liberaliza- ating rules is difficult to draw with precision at this stage.
tion of services opens competition in equipment, as For instance, will a firm operating under a British build-
shown by the EC experience in telecommunications. ing society license be able to offer variable mortgages or
Competition in services has induced European PTOs to money market funds in the whole EC, including in EC
abandon their traditional domestic suppliers for cheaper states that prohibit such mortgages and funds? If so, the
sources, and new services have induced European con- French ban on such mortgages will "disadvantage"
sumers to buy new equipment. Developing countries French banks in relation to British banks or to banks from
have largely benefited from these evolutions: the market EC states that allow this service. Similarly, the German
shares of their exports of telecommunications equipment ban on money market funds will work to the "disadvan-
to EC countries increased, on average, by 20 percent in tage" of German banks.
the first two years after the beginning of liberalization, The main benefit of the mutual recognition approach is
and in only a few years some developing countries have to require the minimal effort in regulatory harmoniza-
upgraded their products from phone sets to small termi- tion-a huge gain in efficiency when twelve countries
nals (Messerlin 1990b). These increased exports will are involved. Because of its enormous potential impact,
give developing countries the means to pay for increased the mutual recognition principle is likely to trigger creep-
imports in services, which in turn will allow them to ing resistance to liberalization, as indeed has been seen
improve the efficiency of their economies by decreasing in the efforts of some EC states (led by France) to impose
the costs of services used as inputs. The estimated gains withholding taxes on capital to prevent capital movements
from the 1992 program to the EC countries-2 percent of and limit competition. The ambiguity of the principle is also
their total GNP-look impressive. It is likely, however, likely to generate cases for the Court of Justice.
that they greatly understate the gains to be expected in The Second Banking Directive is flanked by two direc-
developing countries, where the lack of adequate tele- tives-on mutual funds (the "undertakings for collective
communications or finance often has an infinite cost, investment in transferable securities," or UCITS, in EC
since it inhibits potential exports. jargon) and on "investment services" (brokers, dealers,
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and so on). The directives apply to these two types of airport en route to the final destination). Without these two
securities firms the same mix of national treatment and conditions-particularly the first one, which represents a
mutual recognition principles. The three directives con- shift from bilateral to multilateral iberalization-airlines
stitute the backbone of the 1992 program as it applies to have no strong incentives to enter new routes.
banking and securities. The minimal harmonization in pru- The ambiguity of the December 1989 package is that it
dential matters is covered by eight directives on banking, includes these provisions, but only as nonbinding agree-
five on securities, and three on capital movements.16 ments. The 1987 package has not allowed a major break-
through in these matters. The coverage of multiple
INSURANCE. The 1992 program inherited the free estab- designation increased from 5 percent of the scheduled air
lishment principle that was adopted in 1973 for nonlife routes in June 1987 to 7 percent in June 1989, mainly
insurance and in 1979 for life insurance. The huge effort because of Britain's policy. The coverage of the fifth
to harmonize the regulations of the EC states necessary freedom is even lower: one fifth-freedom service was
to transform this principle into actions failed. Insurance operated by a Community airline before 1988 and only
markets remained closed, except for reinsurance. As a 14 in 1989 (Commission 1989).
result, the 1992 program initially focused on the right of TELECOMMUNICATIONS. The content of the 1992 pro-
firms to provide services across the borders of the EC gram conceming telecommunications has been con-
states. Its main success concems the nonlife "large firmed and refined by the December 1989 agreement.
risks"-property and damage risks that involve firms of The program relies on two main directives that strike a
a minimum size, as measured by number of employees, delicate balance between forces in favor of and against
turnover, and assets, and that are estimated to represent liberalization.
50-65 percent of the nonlife market. After 1991 such The directive on telecommunications services states
risks will be offered by insurance firms operating under that value added network services will be liberalized but
home country rules, which implies mutual recognition of that the PTOs will keep their monopoly in basic services.
insurance regulations among EC states. The crucial point-the borderline between the two types
In the remaining areas of nonlife insurance ("small" of services-is defined by the December 1989 agree-
policyholders) and in life insurance, progress has been ment by mid-1991 value added services will cover
limited. As a result of rulings by the Court of Justice advanced services, such as electronic mail and access to
(discussed above), the current 1992 program allows EC computer data bases, and in early 1993 they will be
insurers to compete in all EC states only under host extended to cover basic data communications-at 25 to
country rules. The expected impact of such measures is 30 percent a year, the fastest growing part of the mar-
not high: insurers will not be keen to undertake the huge ket-leaving only telex and voice telephony to basic
costs of penetrating markets in a alien legal environment, services. 18
except through mergers-an ambiguous move from the The directive on open network provisions (ONP) aims
point of view of competition. As a result, the vice-pres- at harmonizing the conditions under which the liberal-
ident of the Commission, Leon Brittan, recently pro- ized telecommunication services industry would gain
posed that the same approach as in banking and securities access to the networks. It states three basic rules: tech-
be followed: insurers would be free to set up branches nical harmonization that allows full connectivity among
in other EC states and to sell their products on the basis the EC networks; minimal standards required for private
of a single license and supervision from the home coun- firms under competition; and harmonization of the prin-
try (Financial Times, November 28, 1989). ciples for setting tariffs, preferably on the basis of cost.
More detailed regulations are to follow the directive. The
AIR TRANSPORT. The December 1989 package expands fact that they will be drafted by a body emanating from
the decisions made in the December 1987 package. the twelve Pros has raised fears of collusion or abuse of
Quota (capacity-sharing) arrangements are dismantled, dominant positions by PTos.
the initiative of basing prices on costs is given back to
airlines by generalizing the "double disapproval" proce- SHPPING. During the 1980s shipping suffered from a
dure, and discounts are authorized.17 These provisions, decline of activity coupled with the emergence of new
however, are not likely to introduce significant changes competitors-an unusual feature among services, and
in competition and fares unless new rights regarding one unfriendly to liberalization. During these years EC
market access are adopted: "multiple designation" (that state shipping policies were limited to waivers to cabo-
is, the capacity to designate more than one carrier to tage rules and to more liberal grants of cargo reserva-
operate the same route) and the fifth freedom (the capac- tions. The progressive implementation of "flagging-out"
ity to set down and pick up passengers at an intermediary policies (opening ship registers, with fewer constraints
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on hiring, meaning lower taxes and wages) is introducing times more funds than the five privatizations undertaken between 1981
a subsidy policy through a "fiscal" delocalization of the and 1984. of scheduled services took off in 1984 with4. Liberalizatiouifshdldsevcsto ffi 94wt
industry. The flagging-out policies have only a modest relaxations of the licensing rules (icenses were given to fly any route,
liberalization component in that the protectionist bias except some specified ones) and the domestic fare approval system
againt crws fom dveloing ounties s reuced fa- (Bamnes 1988).against crews from developing countries is reduced, fa- 5. To license new competitors (such as British Railways) or to
cilitating movement of semiskilled labor. Finally, the authorize the resale of leased lines from British Telecotn might have
drift of liner conferences into cartels backed by interna- been alternatives to the duopoly, if one ignores potential entry by large
tional agreement (the UNCTAD Liner Code) has made foreign finms. Interestingly, Mercury relies on Hong Kong Telecoms
virtually impossible the adoption of more competitive formost of its profits (Financial Times, June 10,1989).
virtually impossible ~~~~~~~~~6. Until 1987 Germany was considered the most protectionist F-c
rules within the EC. state in telecommunications by any standard: a 100 percent state-
The 1992 program in shipping mirrors these problems. owned monopoly dominated public procurements in telecommunica-
Liberalization is slow: freedom to provide services be- tions, and there was no separate regulatory agency, no other networkto provide operator, no separate subsidiaries in competitive markets, and no
tween EC states has been adopted, but freedom to provide unrestricted use of leased liEnes for value added services (Muller 1988,
services within EC states has not. (So far, this is the only p. 172).
1992 directive to be rejected). Competition has difficulty 7. This decision has applied to low-speed data services since April
in emerging: liner conferences have been granted a 1989 and to the much more important high-speed ata services (64Kbit per second and 2 megabit per second lines) since June 1989.
"block exemption" from the competition rules of the 8. Mercury's ability to survive as an independent firm was attrib-
Rome Treaty. utable to the fact that it was owned by Cable & Wireless, a firm that
had a long tradition of world-wide telecommunication systems (Ergas
and Paterson 1989) and was well established in other key areas, such
ROAD TRANSPORT. In road transport the 1992 program IS as Hong Kong; to the most recent technology, which makes possible
starting from scratch with the issuance of 15,000 special considerable flexibility for locating telecommunications hubs in other
permits, to be distributed by EC states, that will be valid countries; and to the competitive pressures from the other side of the
.limited p riods and wil enable haulers to do business Atlantic (although U.S. Judge Harold Greene did bar a joint project offor llmlted penods and Wlll enable haulers to uo Dusmess Nynex and Cable & Wireless for a transatlantic fiber optic telephone
across the Community. cable Financial Times, February 15, 1989).
9. This is confirmed by recent estimates from a National Utility
BUSINESS SERVICES AND LABOR MOVEMENT. The main Services study according to which a standard 3-minute long-distance
main call is three times more expensive in Germany than in Britain and abusiness services dealt with in the 1991 program are local call is 25 percent less expensive in Germany than in Britain
accounting, television programming, and the legal and (Financial Times, June 30, 1989),
medical professions. Nine directives deal with the pro- 10. Directives are Community laws that have to be introduced as
gressive introduction of the mutual recognition principle national laws. Thecomplete 1992program deals withmany othertopicsgressive recognition s~~~~~~~~~~n addition to trade in servicers and rests on 279 directives. The Coin-
in professional services to ensure free movement of mission is increasingly worried about delays in transforming directives
skilled labor. Enforcement of this principle is likely to be into national laws.
a long, contentious process. Semiskilled or unskilled 1 1. For a view about the Ec 1992 program and the Uruguay Round
embracing manufacturing and services, see Sapir (1989). For a view
labor (for instance, in the construction sector) is partly focusing on 1992 and developing countries in services, see Nicolaides
covered by EC provisions dealing with public procure- (1989).
ment, as illustrated by the recent contract for the con- 12. Policies such as flagging out cast some doubt on the value of
,of the Great Bet Bridge in Denmark; the inial the inmmigration argument raised by all industrial countries for limiting
struction of the ureat Belt Bndgitm Denmarx; t,.e ]mal labor movement. Would foreign crews recruited by Ec firms be "less
clause calling for use of Danish labor was dropped after foreign" than foreign crews employed by foreign firms?
the Commission intervened. 13. For a detailed and comprehensive analysis, see Key (1989).
Under artidcle 58 of the Treaty of Rome, subsidiaries of non-Ec banks
benefit from aU the rights accorded by Community law. There were
Notes roughly 530 foreign bank branches in the Ec as of February 1989
(Fitchew 1989).
Grateful acknowledgment is made of comments by Bela Balassa, 14. Some mergers or consortia cover equipment and services, as,
Geza Feketekuty, Brian Hindley, Bemard Hoekman, Gary Sampson, for example, the recent "pact" between British Telecom, s7mr of Italy,
Andre Sapir, Pierre Sauve, Jonathan Scheele, Richard Snape, Maria- and Telefonica of Spain on network modemization, mobile cornmuni-
Francesca Spatolisano and Jean Waelbroeck and of the assistance of a cations, value added services and intemational communications (Fi-
great number of people at the Conmmission f the European Comunties. nancial Times, December 19, 1988).
1. In a veryfew instances the absence of nationalfirms has allowed 15. Galleo is built by British Airways, Kt.M, and Sabena (with
Ecstatestobe hberalforalongtime-DenmaTkintelecommunications Alitalia and Swissair) and Amadeus by Air France, Lufthansa, and
and Luxembourg in airlines are examples. Iberia (with sAs). Galileo is connected with United Airlines (a U.S.
2. Nws are note issuance facilities (revolving facilities that enable airline) and Amadeus with Texas Air (a U.S. airline) and with several
borrowers to issue a stream of short-term notes). Rups are revolving Asian-Pacific airlnes through Abacus, the common CRs of Cathay
underwriting facilities, a kind of guaranteed NSw. Pacific, China Airlnes, Malaysian Airlines, Philippine Airlines, and
3. The "Rytie rules" stated that private financing of public firms Singapore Airlines, which was developed with the tedmical suppon of
should be allowed only if this would result in improved efficiency-a Cable & Wireless.
condition close to a veto with the British Treasury as umpire (Ryrie 16. In banking the main harmonizations concem solvency stan-
1989). The privatization of British Telecoms required the raising of 2.5 dards, own funds, accounts of banks and of foreign branches of banks,
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cross-border provision of house mortgages, and principles to be Hoekman, Bemard, and Michael P. Leidy. 1990. "Antidumping for
adopted by supervisory authorities in dealing with institutions in diffi- Services?" in Matthew Tharakan (editor), Policy Implications of
culties. In securities harmonization provisions deal with information to Antidumping Measures, Amsterdam, North Hudand.
be provided in case of sales to the public or of acquisitions of major Kasper, Daniel M. 1988. Deregulation and Globalization: Liberaliz-
holdings and with insider trading, with derogations for Greece and ing/nternationalTradeinAirServices. Cambridge,Mass.: Balin-
Portugal. Capital adequacy directives covering credit risk and risks ger for the American Enterprise Institute.
related to interestrate, exchangerate, position, and settlementarebeing Key, Sidney J. 1989. Financial Integration in the European Conmnu-
drafted. Capital movements provisions spell out harmonizations with nity. Intemational Finance Discussion Paper 349. Washington,
a longer period of transition for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain D.C.: Federal Reserve System.
and a safeguard clause in case of major macroeconomic problems. Mathisse, Thierry. 1989. The European Conununitys External Trade
17. The 1987 directive on capacities replaced the traditional capac- in Services. Luxembourg: Eurostat.
ity sharing rule (50-50 percent) with a lower quota (45-55 percent and, McGowan, Francis, and Chris Trengrove. 1987. European Aviation:
in October 1989, 40-60 percent). The 1989 agreement targets a 25-75 A Conmnon Market? Institute for Fiscal Studies Report Series no.
peroent quota by the end of 1992. Fares that "reasonably reflect the 23. London.
costs of an individual airline" should be approved by the EC states. Messerlin, Patrick A. 1990a. 'Antidumping Regulations or Procartel
Discount and deep discount fares are available for off-peak periods and Law? The BC Chemical Cases." International Econornic Depart-
specific passenger categories. Fare measures are accompanied by safe- ment, World Bank. Processed.
guards if fares drop by more than 20 percenL . 1990b. "Note on the Benefits from Liberalization in Services
18. But Ec states that wish to issue license conditions for data for the Developing Countries." Intemational Economic Depart-
cormsunications will be able to do so if the conditions are nondiscrim- ment, World Bank. Processed.
inatory and are vetted by the Commission. Greece and Portugal have Muller, Jurgen. 1988. The Benefits ofCorpleting the Internal Market
received a potential derogation up to 1996 if their public services are for Telecommunication. Vol. 10 of Research on the "Cost of
at risk. Non-Europe ,"Basic Findings. Commissionofthe European Com-
munities.
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